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Abstract 
 
This paper analyzes Polish and Spanish proposals relative to the 
EU’s  Southern  and  Eastern  Dimensions.  Furthermore,  plausible 
explanations  are  forwarded  regarding  the  resemblances  between 
Spain’s and Poland’s policies towards neighbourhood: the national 
interests considerations based on the constructivist approach; pol-
icy entrepreneurship in the context of institutional conditions of the 
European Foreign Policy and the process of lessons drawing in the 
framework of the European Foreign Policy policy-making process. 
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1.  Introduction 
 
Since 2002, several EU member states and acceding countries have 
been especially active during the process of designing a new com-
prehensive framework of relations with the neighbouring countries 
that evolved into the European Neighbourhood Policy (ENP). Con-
versely, other member states were not especially interested in the 
creation of such a new institutional and political framework due to 
the fact that the EU already had at its disposal a great deal of poli-
cies,  instruments  and  mechanisms  for  conducting  relations  with 
neighbours. Therefore, in some aspects, ENP seems to constitute 
another layer of EU policies towards its neighbourhood with the 
aim of dealing with the increasing diversity of EU’s member states 
preferences as well as of the neighbours. But at the same time the 
future position of initiatives such as the Barcelona Process or the 
Strategic Partnership with Mediterranean and Middle East remain 
unclear in view of the adoption of the ENP. The celebration of 10th 
anniversary of the Barcelona Process and the Five Year Work Pro-
gramme adopted during the Euro-Mediterranean summit in Novem-
ber 2005 indicate the willingness to continue the cooperation in the 
framework of the Euro-Mediterranean Partnership together with the 
implementation  of  Association  Agreements  and  European 
Neighbourhood  Action  Plans  (Council  of  the  European  Union 
2005b: 1). According to the Chairman statement of this summit, the 
ENP was assessed as an instrument that will “reinforce and com-
plement the Barcelona  Process” (Council of the European Union 
2005c: 2). In view of these ambiguities and potentially overlapping 
frameworks, the divergence between EU member states preferences 
might be considered as a plausible explanation of the current shape 
of the ENP. 
 
This paper analyzes the policies of two member states especially in-
terested  in  EU  policies  towards  its  neighbourhood,  arguing  that 
there are striking similarities between Spanish and Polish projects to 
develop EU policies towards its neighbourhood and in the means 
they use to promote their proposals at the EU level. The paper is di-
vided in two parts. In the first part, Spanish proposals on the EU 
policy  towards  the  Southern  Mediterranean  countries  and  Polish 
proposal of establishing an Eastern Dimension of the EU are de-
scribed in order to outline their similar features. In the second part Natorski: Explaining Spanish and Polish Approaches to the ENP  65 
of the paper some plausible explanations are forwarded regarding 
the  resemblances  between  Spain’s  and  Poland’s  policies  towards 
neighbourhood in the framework of the European Foreign Policy 
(EFP). 
 
The first plausible explanation is based on the assumption that EU 
member  states  perceive  EFP  realm  as  an  additional  arena  where 
their national interests and preferences are pursued. In this sense the 
EFP serve as a “resonance box” for national foreign policies and as 
a point of reference to deal with issues that are difficult to solve 
through unilateral policies. In order to define Spanish and Polish na-
tional interests, the constructivist driven methodology developed by 
Jutta Weldes is adopted. According to her argument, we may define 
national interests as “social constructions created as meaningful ob-
jects out of the intersubjective and culturally established meanings 
with which the world, the international system and the place of the 
states in it, is understood”. In specific, it means that national interest 
emerge  out  of  the  situation  descriptions  and  problem  definitions 
through which state officials and others make sense of the world 
around  them  (Weldes  1996:  280).  The  description  and  problem 
definitions in relation to Spanish and Polish respective neighbouring 
areas are reconstructed in this paper on the basis of texts (academic 
and  policy  analysis)  that  synthesizes  the  world-views  of  policy 
makers in Spain and Poland. 
 
The second plausible explanation refers to the institutional condi-
tions of the EFP framework on foreign policy making of EU mem-
ber states. Due to the nature of collective and multi-level policy-
making  of  the  EFP,  member  states  willing  to  promote  particular 
policies tend to behave as policy entrepreneurs, that is to say, as ac-
tors that represent “the capacity to innovate on the previous courses 
of action” and are willing to invest resources in order to achieve that 
innovation (Bicchi 2002: 4-5). Policies of entrepreneurship pursued 
by member states attempt to hold the leadership in initiatives and 
policies towards specific areas. In order to achieve these objectives, 
entrepreneurs employ different legitimate resources that help to in-
corporate  their  particular  preferences  and  visions  of  the  issue  at 66  European Political Economy Review  
   
stake into the EFP agenda and try to gain support of other actors
1. 
Among these resources, the most important are coalition building 
with actors that share specific national concerns and the use of ar-
guments to persuade other actors that their policy proposals address 
broad European concerns and interests
2. The similarities between 
Spain’s  and  Poland’s  performance  in  the  framework  of  the  EU 
neighbourhood policy might be explained by the fact that the EFP 
institutional  setting  create  incentives  to  use  specific  resources  to 
promote one’s interests. 
 
The third and last source of explanation is the process of lesson-
drawing in the framework of the EFP policy-making. Concretely, in 
the cases addressed in this paper, it will be assessed if Spanish ex-
periences with the projection of the Mediterranean regions in the 
EFP framework were taken into consideration and learned when Po-
land forwarded its propositions on the Eastern Dimension of the EU. 
In general, the lesson-drawing developed by Richard Rose (1993) 
refers to voluntary activity of transfer of innovatory policy devel-
oped elsewhere in the belief that it will be similarly successful in a 
different context (Stone 1999: 52). 
 
2.  Sketching Spanish and Polish proposals on EU policies to-
wards the neighbourhood 
 
The following section describes the content of Spanish and Polish 
proposals regarding the relations between the EU and its neighbour-
ing regions. The section begins with an examination of the Spanish 
input in the establishment and development of the so-called Barce-
lona Process. Following that, the Polish proposal for establishing an 
Eastern  Dimension  of  the  EU  is  presented.  The  presentation  of 
Spanish and Polish proposals on EU policy towards neighbouring 
regions permits to indicate various striking resemblances between 
them. Among these, at least four general features might be outlined. 
                                                 
1  Moreover,  following  the  approach  of  strategic  action,  strategic  use  of 
norms/arguments  within  institutional  environments  (Schimmelfennig  2003b; 
Sedelmeier 2000), it is assumed that the innovation of the existing policy is pur-
sued through rationally-driven actions. 
2 In this sense, the concept of “rhetorical action” (Schimmelfennig 2001, 2003a) 
might serve as the plausible explanation of the behaviour of states trying to ad-
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In the first place, Spain and Poland pursue the inclusion of issues 
related to their respective neighbourhood into the mainstream of the 
EFP, but as a specific and differentiated dimension of it. Secondly, 
both countries propose that the EU should adopt a broad and far-
reaching framework of relations with their respective neighbours, 
encompassing multiple issue-areas where the EU has competences. 
In both cases, these issue-areas included policy and security affairs, 
economic cooperation, people-to-people contacts, and cooperation 
in issues related to Justice and Home Affairs (JHA). Thirdly, both 
countries pursue the establishment of specific instruments of coop-
eration, mainly special funds and programs that would deal with 
specific  concerns  to  foster  cooperation  between  the  EU  and 
neighbour countries. Fourthly, both Spanish and Polish proposals 
forwarded to the EU put special emphasizes in involving the third 
countries  in  specific  common  policies  developed  by  the  EU  and 
member states. 
 
2.1  Spanish Mediterranean agenda in the framework of EFP 
 
Since the beginning of the 1990s Spain became to be perceived as a 
mainstreamer in the EFP, especially in the area of Mediterranean 
cooperation (Barbé 1998b). Initially, Spain proposed that the Medi-
terranean dimension of the institutional system of European security 
should be based on the formulas of bilateral and European Commu-
nity cooperation, the Euro-Arab dialogue, and the Conference on 
Security  and  Cooperation  in  the  Mediterranean  (Dezcallar  1992: 
54)
3. After the failure of various initiatives, Spain later intended 
resolutely to include its Mediterranean agenda within the EU for-
eign policy. Spain supported a comprehensive approach to Mediter-
ranean security and stability, including its military, political, eco-
nomic, social and cultural aspects. Additionally, Spain lobbied for 
greater financial involvement of the EU in the Mediterranean areas, 
which  finally  led  to  an  increase  of  the  financial  package  in  the 
framework  of  the  new  MEDA  programme  (European  Council  in 
Cannes in June 1995) (Baixeras 1996; Tovias 1999: 225-231). 
 
                                                 
3 Therefore, Spain promoted and supported various international initiatives that 
were aimed at institutionalizing the cooperation in the Mediterranean basin, but 
outside the EU framework (Barbé 1991, 1993; Fernández Ordoñez 1991). 68  European Political Economy Review  
   
The result of this active lobbying in favour of Mediterranean issues 
was the celebration in November 1995 of the Barcelona Conference 
that gave ground to the institutionalized Euro-Mediterranean Part-
nership (EMP). However, after the vigorous activity of Felipe Gon-
zález’s socialist governments in the promotion of the Mediterranean 
issues in the EU framework that resulted in the Barcelona Process, 
the new conservative government limited its activity in the Mediter-
ranean to manage the existing framework of relations
4. On the other 
hand,  on  the  side  of  the  Spanish  government  led  by  José  María 
Aznar some criticism started to grow concerning the progress of the 
EMP and the method of the cooperation in the framework of EMP. 
 
Even though the implementation of EMP agenda continued to be 
the priority of the Spanish conservative government, a special em-
phasis was put, at least rhetorically, on the economic aspects of the 
Partnership, namely the conclusion of the Association Agreements 
with  Mediterranean  countries  and  the  reinforcement  of  economic 
cooperation and liberalization. The Spanish Presidency of the EU in 
2002 was used as an opportunity to put forward some ambitious 
projects to be debated during its presidency term, especially with 
the occasion of the Fifth Euro-Mediterranean Conference in Valen-
cia in April 2002. Many of these initiatives were not new in the pri-
orities of the Spanish governments, but acquired new relevance in a 
changed international  context, especially that of the fight against 
terrorism and the dialogue between cultures and civilizations. Spe-
cial attention was also paid to economic issues. Once again Spain 
promoted the creation of the so-called Bank of Euromediterranean 
Development  aimed  at  supporting  economic  development  in  the 
Mediterranean, as was the case of European Bank for Reconstruc-
tion and Development in Eastern Europe
5. Regarding the institu-
tional method of the EMP cooperation, Spain supported the initia-
tive to create a Parliamentary Assembly and, in order to give more 
political continuity to the EMP, Spain advanced the proposition to 
                                                 
4 At the beginning of the first Aznar’s term, some analysts already observed that 
the new Spanish government would provably play a less prominent role in Medi-
terranean politics (Gillespie 1997: 45). 
5 The proposal of setting up a Bank for Euromediterranean Development was wa-
tered  down  with  the  creation  of  a  credit  facility  within  the  framework  of  the 
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create the figure of Mr. MED –a high-level diplomatic official of 
the EU
6. 
 
The results of the Spanish Presidency in 2002 were deemed as posi-
tive for the development of the EMP taking into account the con-
vulsed international context in the Mediterranean area. The Valen-
cia Action Plan detailing a “road map” for the EMP was agreed 
among 27 participants. Among other numerous initiatives, the Plan 
paid special attention to initiatives aimed at fighting against terror-
ism and organized crime and other issues linked to the Justice and 
Home Affairs. Despite that measures related to JHA were included 
in the social and cultural chapter, their horizontal content gained 
particular political relevance. The  Action Plan  also advanced the 
idea of strengthening cooperation in the field of ESDP. 
 
The economic chapter of the Action Plan was extensive and, among 
many initiatives, it confirmed the political compromise of creating 
in 2010 a Euro-Mediterranean free trade area. The Valencia Action 
Plan also supported the processes of south-south trade integration; 
the promotion of investment in infrastructures and interconnections 
in transports, energy and telecommunications networks, etc. Con-
crete initiatives were also approved in the social, cultural and hu-
manitarian chapter, among others, the setting up of a Euromediter-
ranean Foundation for Dialogue between Civilizations (a Spanish-
Swedish initiative in origin), and the adoption of the Action Plan on 
the Dialogue between Cultures and Civilizations. 
 
Foreign  policy  of  the  socialist  government  elected  in  2004  has 
sought to upgrade Spanish Mediterranean agenda focusing on the 
improvement of its relations with Morocco. However, the renewed 
interest in Mediterranean issues does not imply broad changes in the 
policy proposals advanced by Spain. Actually, Spanish priorities in 
the Mediterranean agenda are focused on its symbolic dimension, as 
for example the celebration of the anniversary conference in Barce-
                                                 
6 Spanish agenda regarding the EMP was presented in the speech of Spanish Sec-
retary of State Miguel Nadal in the Committee of Foreign Affairs in European 
Parliament (Nadal 2002). For a comprehensive evaluation of proposals and ad-
vances in the EMP during Spanish presidency see Soler i Lecha and Walter-Puig 
(2002). 70  European Political Economy Review  
   
lona  at  the  level  of  heads  of  state  or  government.  But  the  main 
Spanish priority seems to be the re-launch of the Barcelona Process 
by adapting it to the new international situation. In this sense, Spain 
insists that the adaptation of the EMP should address both the inter-
national context and challenges (terrorism, proliferation of weapons 
of mass destruction, human and drugs trafficking, money laundering 
and organized crime) as well as the internal development in the EU, 
mainly the problems arising from the illegal immigration (Barbé, 
Soler i Lecha 2005: 94-98). 
 
Spanish agenda on the future of the EMP is quite extensive, but 
there are five areas of cooperation with the Mediterranean countries 
that are of special importance from the Spanish point of view: ter-
rorism and proliferation of weapons of mass-destruction; greater po-
litical  and  economic  reforms  and  trade  liberalization;  education; 
democratic values, tolerance and  common respect; and migration 
and social integration
7. In view of this broad Spanish Mediterranean 
agenda, the 10th anniversary of the Barcelona Conference was per-
ceived by the socialist government as an opportunity to renew the 
EU compromise with the Mediterranean basin and to give greater 
visibility to the Mediterranean agenda in the enlarged EU. 
 
In view of this anniversary Spain proposed series of initiatives and 
projects to be adopted in the framework of the EMP. The point of 
departure of the Spanish propositions is the emphasis on “the need 
of political and security cooperation for a definition of a common 
area of peace and stability” that should include: political dialogue, 
prevention  and  conflicts  resolution,  strengthening  of  democracy, 
expansion of the area of freedom, good governance and better pro-
tection of human rights, and all those processes that include citi-
zens’  participation;  inclusion  of  Mediterranean  partners  in  the 
ESDP dialogue; reinforcement of cooperation in the fight against 
terrorism; and the deepening of the institutionalization of the politi-
cal dialogue through the Euro-Mediterranean Parliamentary Assem-
bly, creation of informal Ad-hoc Groups and Pilot Projects based on 
the  concept  of  variable  geometries,  twinning  projects  in  JHA-
related areas (police and security forces training, justice administra-
                                                 
7 Spanish proposals concerning the EMP are based on the speech delivered by 
Spanish secretary of European Affairs, Miguel Ángel Navarro Portera (2005). Natorski: Explaining Spanish and Polish Approaches to the ENP  71 
tion, border management, fight against terrorism or money launder-
ing), and last but not least, institutionalization of ministerial meet-
ings  on  JHA  supplemented  by  senior  officials’  meetings  to  deal 
with asylum and migration issues. 
 
The proposed measures to foster economic and financial coopera-
tion remain the same as, for example, the promotion of economic 
and institutional reforms or the reinforcement of cooperation in the 
economic and financial areas and the fostering of macro-economic 
dialogue. Spain also stressed the importance of greater civil society 
participation and people-to-people contacts (Erasmus-type scholar-
ships and cooperation between universities and academic sectors); 
combat of illiteracy, promotion of education and gender equality; 
participation of regions and municipalities in the Barcelona Process; 
and enhancing cooperation in migration matters, an “extremely im-
portant area”. 
 
From the Spanish point of view, the Barcelona Process remains the 
core  of  the  relationship  between  the  EU  and  the  Mediterranean 
countries, even after the adoption of the ENP. New instruments and 
policies towards the neighbourhood are perceived as additional in-
struments to strengthen the economic or political dimensions of the 
Barcelona  Process.  Similarly,  Spanish  aims  at  subordinating  the 
“Strategic Partnership with the Mediterranean and the Middle East” 
to the Barcelona Process. As stated by the Spanish Ministry of For-
eign Affairs, Miguel Ángel Moratinos, Spain’s position on the ENP 
is to “avoid that the policy of new neighbours ends up being a hid-
den pre-accession policy for the Eastern countries, thus confirming 
the discrimination between regions, and to make sure that the new 
Strategic  Association  for  the  Mediterranean  and  the  Middle  East 
does not deviate the Union’s attention from the Barcelona Process”
8. 
 
2.2 Polish proposal of Eastern Dimension of the EU 
 
Poland is a newcomer in the EU, but even before the accession to 
the EU in May 2004, this country presented its own proposals on 
the EU towards its Eastern neighbourhood. Since the very begin-
                                                 
8 Diario de Sesiones de las Cortes Generales, Comisiones Mixtas (para la Unión 
Europea), VIII Legislatura, 20, 20 December 2004, p. 7. 72  European Political Economy Review  
   
ning of accession negotiations, Poland indicated its willingness to 
participate in the CFSP policy-making and to contribute to the crea-
tion of an EU Eastern Dimension and orientate decisively its con-
tent. In June 2001 Poland submitted to the EU presidency its initial 
position on the future of the relations with Eastern neighbours (Min-
istry  of  Foreign  Affairs  2001).  Since  then,  Polish  propositions 
evolved from very generic ideas and assumptions to more detailed 
proposals of solutions and mechanisms to be implemented in the 
EU Eastern policy. In the subsequent months, Poland presented fur-
ther thorough positions on this topic (Hübner 2002; Cimoszewicz 
2002), but the most important and comprehensive document on the 
future of relations with Eastern neighbours was the non-paper pre-
sented in January 2003, just after the conclusion of the accession 
negotiations  (Ministry  of  Foreign  Affairs  2003;  Cimoszewicz 
2003a). 
 
From the institutional point of view, the creation of the Eastern Di-
mension of the EU pursued the establishment of a broad framework 
of coordination for the relations with Eastern neighbours of the EU. 
Poland perceived the EU as the leading international actor in the 
Eastern neighbourhood. Therefore the Eastern Dimension of the EU, 
an “umbrella framework” or new “regional platform for coopera-
tion”, should constitute a coordination mechanism for policies and 
projects inside the EU in order to create better synergies between 
EU activities towards other regional as well as international struc-
tures and organizations active in the region. Following the Polish 
proposals, the Eastern Dimension of the EU should be constituted 
by three pillars: EU activities (CFSP and RELEX activities), poli-
cies of the EU member states both in its bilateral as well as multi-
lateral form, and non-governmental activities of the institutions of 
civil society (Ministry of Foreign Affairs 2003: 87). 
 
An important evolution is observed in relation to the issue of which 
countries should be involved in the Eastern Dimension of the EU. In 
2001 Poland proposed that the future Eastern Dimension should ad-
dress the whole post-soviet space, although differentiating between 
Eastern European countries, the countries of the Caucasus and Cen-
tral Asia, and with special emphasis put on Russia, Kaliningrad, and 
Ukraine. However, in other positions, Poland focused its attention 
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Ukraine,  Belarus,  Moldova  and  Russia.  Finally,  Russia  was  ex-
cluded  from  Polish  considerations  about  the  Eastern  Dimension, 
since “the existing framework of cooperation is well developed and 
seems to function quite well” (Ministry of Foreign Affairs 2003: 89). 
Moreover, the new Eastern policy had to be a mean of supporting 
the integration of neighbours within the EU and therefore “this ele-
ment is not applicable to Russia, which does not aspire to the EU 
membership”  (Cimoszewicz  2004:  22).  Regarding  Russia,  Polish 
positions initially stressed that Russia’s future relations with the EU 
should focus on making “better use of the existing framework of 
cooperation  to  achieve  specific  results”  (Cimoszewicz  2003b:  8) 
and supported the idea of developing the concept of common Euro-
pean economic space. After the EU-Russia summit in May 2003, 
Poland supported the idea of the “four common spaces” that should 
be also applied to EU relations with Ukraine and Moldova but “tai-
lored to their European aspirations” (Cimoszewicz 2003d: 8). 
 
Consequently, Poland initially did not adopt a clear position on the 
final purpose of the Eastern Dimension of the EU. Instead, many 
and diverse ideas, such as trade agreements, new generation of as-
sociation agreements, customs union, “enhanced co-operation” or 
confederation between the EU and Ukraine, and EU and Belarus, 
were advanced as possible frameworks of relations (Hübner 2002: 
6). But finally, Poland adopted the position that the EU should pur-
sue an “open doors policy” and support “European perspective” of 
the countries that are willing to adhere to the EU in the future and 
are ready to accomplish with accession criteria’s. Poland put special 
emphasis on Ukraine, arguing that it is “the interest of the enlarged 
EU to recognize the European choice of this country, which is im-
portant for stability and security in the eastern part of the continent” 
and in consequence, the EU should appreciate in its own interest 
“long-term European policy towards the country’s membership to 
the EU” (Ministry of Foreign Affairs 2003: 88). The European per-
spective for Belarus and Moldova was conversely considered with 
more caution in the Polish proposals due to the internal situation in 
both countries. 
 
The definition of principles and rules which should govern this pol-
icy also evolved. According to Poland, the first principle, that of 
conditionality, “should be applied consistently to the relations with 74  European Political Economy Review  
   
all Eastern European neighbours, neither discriminating nor favour-
ing any of them”. This principle should depend on the progress in 
democratic reforms, the respect of human rights and minority rights 
and values upon which the Union is based and “the standards rec-
ognized by the international community in international relations”, 
and on “building democratic institutions and market economy, im-
proving  governance  as  well  as  fighting  corruption”  (Ministry  of 
Foreign Affairs 2003: 93). 
 
The principle of conditionality gives ground to the second principle 
that would rule the Eastern Dimension of the EU: the principle of 
differentiation.  This  principle  has  two  aims:  the  differentiation 
among the target countries of the initiative and the differentiation of 
the Eastern Dimension of the EU from other EFP initiatives. Firstly, 
the  differentiation  should  enable  individual  development  of  rela-
tions with each of the states implicated taking into account the dif-
ferences between the Eastern states and their different needs and as-
pirations. In this sense, the differentiation was aimed at instituting 
the equality between Eastern states in relations with the EU (Minis-
try of Foreign Affairs 2003: 86). According to Polish proposals, the 
Eastern  Dimension  should  constitute  a  “coherent,  comprehensive 
framework of its eastern policy that will enable individual devel-
opment of relations with each of the countries concerned, without 
prejudicing their final formula” (Ministry of Foreign Affairs 2003: 
86). Secondly, the Eastern Dimension was approached as a way to 
differentiate the EU policy towards its Eastern neighbours from the 
policies undertaken in the framework of the Northern Dimension or 
the Barcelona Process. Due to the “essential differences” between 
Eastern and Southern neighbouring states a “different approach and 
diverse  policies  of  the  Union  towards  these  two  regions”  were 
strongly supported (Cimoszewicz 2003c: 43). 
 
In  proposals  concerning  the  future  of  relations  with  Eastern 
neighbours of the enlarged EU, Poland proposed numerous mecha-
nisms and areas of cooperation: deepened political dialogue with 
regular consultations in the areas of economy, home affairs, energy; 
gradual,  asymmetrical  liberalization  of  trade  in  close  connection 
with reforms in key areas of economic life; EU’s involvement in 
development  of  the  energy  and  transport  infrastructure;  ensuring 
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operation in the area of justice and home affairs; support to the hu-
man dimension of regional co-operation: exchange of youth, access 
to educational programs (Hübner 2002; Cimoszewicz 2002). These 
initial proposals were further detailed in additional documents and 
were divided into seven issue-areas: enhanced political dialogue of 
the EU with Eastern neighbours; assistance in democratic and eco-
nomic transformations; economic cooperation that would lead to the 
establishment of the free trade zone with the EU; energy coopera-
tion with Russia and Ukraine aiming at securing stable and reliable 
energy supply to the enlarged EU, focusing on joint infrastructure 
projects in the energy sector, transport and communication; coop-
eration in the area of justice and home affairs; solution of security 
problems, including crisis prevention and management; and people-
to-people  contacts,  cultural  contacts  and  access  to  information 
(Ministry of Foreign Affairs 2003: 90-93). 
 
Poland also proposed to upgrade the existing agreements between 
the EU and Ukraine, and between the EU and Moldova to the level 
of Association Agreements. Additionally, Poland put special em-
phasis on the assistance and cooperation programmes, which in the 
light of these proposals, seem very comparable to pre-accession or 
even EU’s regional development programs. In order to allow greater 
synergies  between  projects,  Poland  supported  the  reform  of  the 
TACIS  programme  and  a  better  coordination  between  TACIS, 
INTERREG  and  PHARE  Cross-border  Cooperation  programmes. 
Poland also proposed the establishment of a European Democracy 
Fund directed to NGOs in targeted countries; European Scholarship 
Programme and European Traineeship Programme; assistance pro-
grammes in institutional building, twinning projects and technical 
assistance in developing local government structures, establishment 
of a European Information Centre; assistance in development of in-
frastructural linking (new border crossing); the development of re-
gional  and  cross-border  cooperation;  training  courses,  support  to 
business incubators or establishment of European Investment Fund 
for Eastern Europe directed to small and medium enterprises (Min-
istry of Foreign Affairs 2003: 94-97). To a certain degree, it can be 
observed that these propositions are based on the own experiences 
and best practices identified during Polish process of accession to 
the EU. 
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A significant part of these ideas and detailed solutions supported by 
Poland were reflected in the ENP documents. However, the basic 
Polish proposition of creating an Eastern Dimension of the EU as a 
separate framework of relations did not materialize and the effects 
of Polish input to the overall ENP framework were rather mixed. 
However, after the adoption of the ENP, Poland kept pressing to in-
clude its propositions and points of view in the documents and plans 
prepared for the implementation of the ENP. It is especially the case 
of the Action Plan for Ukraine, into which Poland achieved to in-
clude after the Orange Revolution various proposals forwarded with 
Germany in October 2004
9. Thus, even if the project of Eastern 
Dimension did not finally prosper, the Polish agenda for relations 
with Eastern neighbours was not abandoned. 
 
 
3.  Three explanations of Spanish and Polish positions on the 
ENP:  national  interests,  institutional  conditions  and  lessons 
drawing 
 
This section examines the three possible groups of causes explain-
ing the emergence of Spanish and Polish similar approaches to EU 
neighbourhood policies in the framework of the EFP: first, Spanish 
and Polish similar perceptions and the understanding of national in-
terests regarding their respective neighbourhoods; second, the insti-
tutional environment of the EFP, which encourage similar ways to 
advance national Spanish and Polish priorities; and third, the exis-
tence of learning process in Poland drawing from former Spanish 
experiences in promoting the Mediterranean Dimension of the EFP. 
 
3.1. National concerns at stake 
 
The first explanation of the resemblance of Polish and Spanish pri-
orities as regards the ENP might be explained by their analogous 
                                                 
9 In October 2004 Poland and Germany forwarded common proposals of how to 
strengthen the relations between Ukraine and the EU. These proposals included, 
among others, strengthening political and security dialogue, conclusion of new 
EU-Ukraine agreement, flexibility in existing visa regime, recognition of Ukraine 
as free-market economy, preparation to the agreement on free trade area between 
Ukraine and EU and participation of Ukraine in Internal Market (Rada Ministrów 
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national  concerns  emerging  from  converging  perceptions  on  the 
challenges and opportunities posed by their respective neighbour-
hoods. It is assumed that dominant national concerns constitute the 
basis for construction of national interests, driving motivations for 
national foreign policy actions. In Spanish as well as Polish cases 
these concerns are related to the security aspects of their respective 
foreign policies in the neighbourhood. 
 
In the Spanish case, the Mediterranean dimension constitutes one of 
the fixed axes of the foreign policy, based both on the geographical 
proximity and historical tradition. Southern Mediterranean region 
and “autonomous scenarios of conflict” in Northern Africa repre-
sented the main source of security concerns and potential conflicts 
during the Spanish transition towards democracy initiated in 1970s 
(Ceuta, Melilla, Gibraltar straight, internal conflicts in Northern Af-
rica,  Canary  Islands)  (Morán  1980:  143-147,  Viñas  1984;  Fisas 
1985: 143-144, 168-233; Alonso Zaldívar 1988: 71-73). The turning 
point in the Spanish perception of the Mediterranean region coin-
cided with the end of the Cold War and the first war in the Persian 
Gulf. Two factors constitute the roots of the Spanish foreign policy 
in the Mediterranean region since the end of Cold War. 
 
In first place, security concerns that had been traditionally charac-
terized by military and territorial issues were reconsidered and rede-
fined so as to include broader sources of security challenges and 
threats. Although previous military threats and challenges did not 
entirely disappear, Spanish concerns focused on “soft” security is-
sues related to the possible negative externalities coming from the 
economic décalage between the both shores of Mediterranean basin: 
social  instability,  immigration  pressures,  Islamic  fundamentalism 
and demographic boom in southern Mediterranean countries. In this 
sense, the perception of an increasing interdependence between the 
two shores of the Mediterranean Sea, started to be seriously consid-
ered by Spanish foreign policy makers. Therefore, Spain was in-
creasingly conscious that their security could be affected by nega-
tive spill-over effects arising from enduring political, economic and 
social  crisis  in  the  neighbouring  region,  and  in  consequence,  the 
Mediterranean continued to be perceived as the main security prior-
ity  (Grasa  1993;  del  Campo  1992,  1998;  del  Campo,  Camacho 
2003). 78  European Political Economy Review  
   
 
The events in the 21st century further reinforced the perception of 
the Mediterranean as a source of insecurity. The conflict with Mo-
rocco in July 2002 on the Island of Perejil-Leyla reaffirmed that 
Spanish territory interests in North Africa might be challenged also 
by a military conflict. Later on, as a consequence of the terrorist at-
tacks of 11 September 2001 in United States and 11 March 2004 in 
Madrid, the fight against terrorism was placed on the top of Spanish 
priorities in the Mediterranean region. Additionally, the perception 
of insecurity increased with the enduring conflicts (especially West-
ern Sahara) that confront the main powers of the region. 
 
The second consequence of the changes in international system af-
ter the Cold War was the intensification of the Spanish “periphery 
syndrome” based on the perception that as a consequence of the col-
lapse of the Warsaw Pact, the European political agenda would be 
absorbed  exclusively  by  the  concerns  regarding  Eastern  Europe. 
This new situation have continuously aroused the Spanish concern 
that, being situated in the other end of the European continent, the 
country might be left alone with its particular concerns and prob-
lems originating in the  Mediterranean. Therefore, Spain has ever 
since opposed to the tendency that Eastern Europe could turn out to 
be considered the most important challenge to the European secu-
rity. From the early 1990s Spain defined its foreign policy in the 
framework of the EFP with the aim to balancing between Southern 
and  Eastern  dimensions  of  EU’s  neighbourhood  (Barbé  1998a) 
through  the  policy  of  advocating  its  own  international  objective, 
particularly in the Maghreb, promoting the Mediterranean issues in 
every of the European institutions and changing its security policy, 
with the purpose of participating in the core of the “international 
Europe” (Barbé 1996: 260). In view of these constrains and oppor-
tunities offered by the EU, the projections of national concerns and 
problem  transfer  (Torreblanca  2001)  to  the  EU’s  level  was  per-
ceived as the rational approach to deal with issues that were hardly 
resolvable unilaterally outside the EFP realm. 
 
Polish activity in promoting the Eastern Dimension of the EU also 
corresponds to specific security concerns originating from the East-
ern neighbourhood of this country. It is due to various internal fac-Natorski: Explaining Spanish and Polish Approaches to the ENP  79 
tors that Poland appears to be very active in the domain of the East-
ern Dimension in the framework of the EFP. 
 
Generally, Polish perception of its Eastern neighbourhood as a vital 
security area is grounded on historical experiences and geographical 
proximity  to  the  potentially  turbulent  Eastern  neighbourhood 
shape
10. Despite the fact that the immediate consequence of the dis-
integration of the Soviet Union was confusion and uncertainty re-
garding the prospects of new states that emerged in the post-soviet 
space, Poland tried constantly to influence the developments of the 
situation on its Eastern border in order to secure the conditions for 
its newly acquired pro-Western orientation. Thus, this perception of 
challenges for Polish security emerged from both the weakness of 
authorities of the new post-soviet states and the possibility of return 
of hegemonic and expansionist tendencies in Russia (Kościuk 1993: 
36-44; Kuźnir 1993: 15). The fundamental concern in the Polish 
perception was the prospect on the geopolitical constellation that 
could emerge as a consequence of the transformation processes in 
the post-soviet area. Consequently also the Polish “security strat-
egy” from 1992 identified on its Eastern border the most important 
sources of external threats and challenges
11. As a result of this con-
stellation of factors, the driving motivation of Polish foreign policy 
during 1990s was to avoid Poland and Central Europe becoming a 
buffer zone between the ex-Soviet Union countries and the West, 
that is to say, to avoid the reappearance of historically well-known 
risk to be sandwiched between a powerful Germany  and Russia. 
Therefore, from the beginning of 1990s, Polish foreign and security 
strategic priorities were aimed at the accession to NATO and the 
EU in order to assure Polish security and create conditions to en-
hance  economic  and  social  transformations  towards  a  stable  and 
free market democracy. Polish Eastern policy was subsumed into 
this  overshadowing  strategic  aim,  but  the  conscience  of  interde-
                                                 
10 Polish strategic culture, and hence Polish foreign and security activities, is mo-
tivated in great manner by historically-driven arguments and the construction and 
reconstruction of the past in Polish public discourse (Osica 2004). 
11 “ZałoŜenia  polskiej  polityki  bezpieczeństwa  oraz  polítiki  bezieczeństwa  i 
strategii  obrony  Rzeczypospolitej  Polskiej,  Warszawa,  2  listopada  1992”,  in: 
“Strategie bezpieczeństwa narodowego Polski po 1989 roku”, Zeszyty Akademii 
Dyplomatycznej, 13, part II, Warszawa: Akademia Dyplomatyczna Ministerstwa 
Spraw Zagranicznych 2004, pp. 15-16. 80  European Political Economy Review  
   
pendences  between  these  two  directions  of  Polish  foreign  policy 
was growing (Ziółkowski 2001: 37-38). This apparent contradiction 
was translated into the thesis that vigorous Polish Eastern policy 
would facilitate the integration of Poland into NATO and EU (Gar-
nett 1997, Pavliuk 1997: 53) which in turn would counterbalance 
the most important challenges to Polish security situated on the East 
(Zięba 1997). 
 
The emergence of new independent states on the Eastern border of 
Poland created absolutely new geostrategic conditions for its secu-
rity and foreign policy. For example, from Polish perception the in-
dependent Ukraine prevents the recreation of  “neo-imperial” ten-
dencies in Russia and increases the security and independence of 
Poland  from  direct  Russian  interferences
12.  Therefore,  in  Polish 
eyes, the emergence of an independent Ukraine, “new great power” 
in Europe, constituted “an absolutely new feature of Poland’s geo-
political environment, one of major qualitative significance” (Koś-
ciuk 1993: 42). Since 1991, Poland’s eastern policy was developed 
exclusively  in  the  framework  of  bilateral  relations  with  Russia, 
Ukraine and Belarus. 
 
The relations with Russia were throughout the 1990s immersed in 
constant crisis over Russian disagreement on NATO’s enlargement, 
and after a short period of visible improvement in 2002, the rela-
tions worsened due to Polish engagement in the Orange Revolution 
in Ukraine. Currently Russia constitutes the primary concern in Pol-
ish foreign policy since its policy, for example of energy supplies or 
its “near abroad” policy, is perceived as potentially harmful for Pol-
ish interests. Poland aimed at preventing the possibility that Russia 
might  use  Polish  energetic  dependence  from  Russian  energy  re-
sources to blackmail Poland and other countries. Another concern 
regarding Russia was that this country could hinder Ukrainian proc-
esses of internal democratic transformations and the maintenance of 
a Euro-Atlantic-oriented foreign policy. 
 
                                                 
12 Some analysts even argued that close relations between Poland and Ukraine 
constitute an extremely important new feature in the post-cold  war  system of 
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In view of these divergences, Polish-Ukrainian relations have been 
plainly different from the Polish-Russian ones. Since mid-1990s Po-
land  and  Ukraine  started  to  develop  their  relations  in  what  was 
termed  as  “strategic  partnership”  (Burant  1999;  Zięba  2002; 
Wolczuk, Wolczuk 2003). From the Polish point of view, Ukraine 
is the basic point of reference on its Eastern border, as this country 
constitutes a valuable partner to counter-balance the risks related to 
Russia. And for Poland a pro-European Ukraine is of strategic in-
terest because it would permit to directly attach the biggest Eastern 
neighbour to the Euro-Atlantic system of security and to prevent 
Russia from recreating an imperial policy in its “near abroad”. Bela-
rus,  in  its  turn,  constitutes  the  third  point  of  reference  in  Polish 
Eastern policy. Due to the authoritarian regime in this country, the 
violation of minority rights of the Polish minority and criticisms to 
the Polish pro-Western policy, this country constitutes a permanent 
source of tensions. 
 
In general, from the Polish point of view, Eastern neighbourhood 
constitutes the major source of challenges and risks to its security. 
These concerns appear to be an important motive to initiate actions 
directed to develop EU policies and strategies to address these is-
sues. 
 
3.2. Projection of national concerns in the EFP framework. 
 
The second advanced explanation was that the EFP institutional set-
ting encourages Spain and Poland to promote their priorities em-
ploying a similar range of mechanisms and arguments aimed at the 
incorporation of their proposals into the EFP agenda. In first place, 
diplomatic actions pursued by both states to promote their proposals 
comprise coalition building among states and other actors that could 
be “receptive” and/or “sensitive” to the issues raised
13. Additionally 
to the employment of diplomatic resources of coalition building or 
gaining the institutions’ support, Spanish and Polish actions aimed 
at projecting their specific priorities were based on a preconceived 
argumentative discourse. In both cases actors attempt to convince 
                                                 
13 The undertakings to build a coalition to support a given policy include also EU 
institutions, mainly the European Commission and the European Parliament. 82  European Political Economy Review  
   
partners that their propositions are based on the legitimate defence 
of European and not only national interests. 
 
Coalitions of “sensitiveness” 
Spanish policy directed to promote Mediterranean issues in the EFP 
framework required continued diplomatic efforts, together with  a 
great dose of flexibility to adapt to changing contexts inside and 
outside of the EU. According to Gillespie (1997: 40), Spain used 
the combination of alliance, pressure and compromise to achieve 
progress  in  the  preparation  of  Barcelona  Conference’s  financial 
package. Spain assumed that the cooperation with Italy and France 
should contribute to “convince European countries that we should 
turn to the Mediterranean, towards the South, and design a policy 
that will also improve the European security and stability, through 
establishing mechanisms of economic, cultural,  political coopera-
tion with these countries, facing together the demographic and fun-
damentalism  challenges  that  are  threatening  the  stabilization  of 
these  countries  and  the  calm  in  the  Mediterranean”  (Serra  1990: 
204). In result of this coalition building strategy based on the as-
sumed shared Mediterranean sensitiveness of some countries, “the 
Euro-Mediterranean Partnership Initiative should be seen more as a 
product, not of North-South partnership, but of Hispano-French and 
southern European countries, secured by González among others” 
(Gillespie 1997:46). 
 
Spain has also consistently looked for support from the part of EU 
institutions. The role of national representatives in EU institutions 
has been crucial to translate Spanish particular concerns. The role of 
Spanish  officials  was  particularly  visible  during  the  preparatory 
phase of the Barcelona Conference, when relevant positions in the 
European Commission were occupied by Spaniards
14. But not only 
Spanish top-officials were involved into the launching of the Barce-
lona Process, but also distinct departments of the European Com-
                                                 
14 For example, the current President of the Spanish Parliament, Manuel Marín, 
was the Commissioner in charge of relations with the Southern Mediterranean; 
current Spanish Special Ambassador for Mediterranean Affairs, Juan Prat worked 
for the Commission on the launching of the EMP. Before, Commissioner Abel 
Matutes was responsible for Mediterranean, North-South and Latin America rela-
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mission dealing with Mediterranean issues were held by Spanish 
communitarian officials. Similarly, the committees and other bodies 
of the European Parliament relevant for the foreign policy actions 
were dominated by Spanish Members of the European Parliament 
(MEPs). The Spanish interest has been especially evident in Spanish 
MEPs’  participation  in  the  interparliamentary  delegations  in  that 
they have usually obtained the chairs or vice-chairs of the delega-
tions for relations with the Maghreb (Herranz 2005: 93-94). 
 
The Conference in Barcelona in November 1995 “represented an 
important diplomatic triumph for Spain that helped her emergence 
as a southern force within the EU”, but on the other hand “it also 
tied Spain’s external prestige very closely to the success or failure 
of the EMP, which was to be developed in a notoriously unpredict-
able part of the world” (Gillespie 2000: 156). This diplomatic suc-
cess allowed Spain to gain leadership in the Mediterranean dimen-
sion of the EFP recognized by other actors. The direct involvement 
of Spaniards in the EU policy making towards the Mediterranean 
region explains also the attitude of “ownership” and responsibility 
for the progress and results of the Barcelona Process. 
 
Poland promotes its ideas about the Eastern Dimensions of the EU 
by  employing  similar  diplomatic  and  institutional  resources  as 
Spain. In order to build up wider coalition of states willing to en-
hance EU’s relations with the Eastern neighbourhood, Poland also 
employed manifold diplomatic resources. Recently, the majority of 
these efforts have been focused on relations between the EU and 
Ukraine, so that Polish advocacy for an Eastern dimension has been 
replaced by the support of the “European perspective for Ukraine”. 
 
Due to the fact that the debate on the ENP took place before Po-
land’s accession to the EU, many of these actions were developed 
outside the framework of the EU. Especially visible was the Polish 
activity in the framework of several Central European subregional 
and  regional  organizations.  Poland  tried  to  gain  advantage  when 
holding the presidencies of these organizations in order to frame the 
agenda of the political debates. This is the case of Poland’s Presi-
dency term of the Central Europe Initiative (CEI) in 2003, when Po-
land proposed to evaluate together with the EU institutions the role 
of  the  CEI  in  the  future  Eastern  Dimension  of  the  EU.  Political 84  European Political Economy Review  
   
meetings in the frameworks of the organization were dominated by 
the debates on the Eastern Dimension of the EU and the ENP. Dur-
ing the Polish Presidency in the Council of States of the Baltic Sea 
(2004/2005), Poland also indicated the need to involve this organi-
zation into the debate on the ENP and the Eastern Dimension. And 
finally, the Polish Presidency of the Visegrád Group (2004/2005) 
was considered as a useful framework of cooperation between the 
members of the group on issues related to the Eastern Dimension 
and it is expected to contribute to the debate on the ENP (Visegrád 
Group 2004a). During and after the Orange Revolution in Ukraine, 
the  Visegrád  Group  already  issued  statements  supporting  the 
“European perspective” for Ukraine (Visegrád Group 2004b, 2005). 
And finally, Poland looked for support for their propositions during 
the meetings held in the framework of the Weimar Triangle. 
 
On the other hand, Poland was also trying to get support from other 
individual  EU  member  states.  During  the  debate  on  the  ENP,  it 
emerged an informal group of states (the so-called E-11 caucus) in-
terested in the Eastern Dimension of the EU in broad sense, and es-
pecially in relations between the EU and Ukraine
15. Polish coopera-
tion with other member states was especially active during the Or-
ange Revolution crisis when Poland worked together with Lithuania 
and Germany and in further phases, it presented various joint initia-
tives on enhancing relations between the EU and Ukraine. It seems 
that, despite their differences, Poland perceive Lithuania and Ger-
many  as  the  main  two  partners  to  pursue  EU  policy  towards 
Ukraine
16. 
 
Since its accession to the EU, Poland also made use of the EU insti-
tutions in order to gain support for its preferred policies. Despite 
that the EP is deserved a secondary role in the general architecture 
of ENP, it constitutes a central arena for Polish lobbying on how to 
implement this policy. Cooperation between Polish MEPs from dif-
                                                 
15 This group of states that are “involved and feel the Eastern policy” (EuroPAP 
2004) comprises Finland, Sweden, Denmark, Austria, Lithuania, Latvia, Estonia, 
Slovakia, Czech Republic, Hungary, and Poland. However, the establishment of 
this informal group was criticized by other EU member states and institutions 
(Gromadzki et al. 2005: 15). 
16 The prospects of Polish-Germany cooperation in issues related to Ukraine are 
analyzed by Fałkowski and Lang (2004). Natorski: Explaining Spanish and Polish Approaches to the ENP  85 
ferent political groups has contributed to an increasing awareness of 
the EP of the issues related to Ukraine or Belarus. Similarly to the 
Spanish case, Polish MEPs predominate in the inter-parliamentary 
delegations  with  Eastern  European  states.  Again,  a  Polish  MEP, 
Konrad Szymański, was nominated as EP’s rapporteur on the regu-
lation establishing a European Neighbourhood and Partnership In-
strument. On the other hand, this use of the European Parliament’s 
instruments was especially visible also during the Orange Revolu-
tion in Ukraine. This case was assessed by MEPs and members of 
the EP’s Secretariat as an example of how the European Parliament 
ought to function during international crisis (Herranz 2005: 91-93). 
And finally, in January 2005 Polish MEPs were the initiators of an 
EP resolution that called the Council and Commission “to consider 
at the same time a revision of the European Neighbourhood Policy 
Action Plan, which must take account of the new situation, thus giv-
ing the new Ukrainian Government the opportunity to renegotiate 
the Plan in the light of its deep aspirations for European integration” 
(European Parliament 2005)
17. Nationality of EU officials in other 
institutions also seems to have important role. For example, in spite 
of the fact that the Polish Commissioner, Danuta Hübner, deals with 
regional policy, she was also active in adopting positions supporting 
the EU perspectives of Ukraine
18. 
 
Discourse on “European interests” 
During the promotion of Mediterranean agenda, Spanish diplomats 
assumed  that  their  objective  was  to  “constantly  remember  to  the 
other European countries that the calm in the Mediterranean and the 
guarantee of the security and stability in the countries of the South 
of Europe is vital for the security of the entire Europe” (Serra 1990: 
204). Spain, by trying to convince the other European partners of 
the legitimacy of these claims, wanted to avoid the criticism that the 
country was trying to impose its particular visions of the issue at 
                                                 
17 In result of these pressures, the EU-Ukraine Action Plan was amended in Feb-
ruary and ten additional measures were included by the EU (Council of the Euro-
pean Union 2005a: 13-14). 
18 For example, in the 25 February 2005 Danuta Hübner stated that Ukraine to-
gether with Turkey would become member of the UE as far as in 2015 (EuroPAP 
2005b). This reference was highly criticised by European politics as a too far-
reaching promise, and actually is not included in the text of the delivered speech. 86  European Political Economy Review  
   
stake. In this sense, Gillespie argues that “Spanish officials invaria-
bly insist that they never set out to dominate the Mediterranean pol-
icy-making of the EU, but rather to convince fellow member states 
that the Mediterranean is a European problem, requiring a collective 
response in the interests of Europe’s own stability” (Gillespie 1997: 
34). In order to convince other actors of EFP Spanish representa-
tives have employed various arguments in order to gain support for 
a greater involvement in the Mediterranean. However, the most fre-
quent are those that indicate “European responsibility in the Medi-
terranean”; the need “to guarantee and to strengthen the European 
integration” through the solution of the Mediterranean challenge; 
and the dichotomy of “challenges and opportunities” that represent 
the Mediterranean for Europe. 
 
The “responsibility” of the EU for intensifying relations with Medi-
terranean is justified in Spanish discourse by historical, geographi-
cal, economic, political and cultural reasons. But the “responsibil-
ity”  of  the  EU  for  strengthening  the  relations  with  the  Maghreb 
countries also comes from the fact that the EU is a victim of its own 
success since the EU acquired an important role in the international 
relations. Consequently, due to the “power of attraction” of the EU, 
it  should  assume  its  responsibility  on  the  direct  neighbourhood 
(González Navarro 1992). Spain has also emphasised that stable re-
lations with the Maghreb countries would be beneficial for increas-
ing the efficiency of the EFP or even for the success of the entire 
European integration. In this way, Primer Minister González stated 
that “Europe cannot complete its construction without previously at-
tempting  to  solve  the  accumulated  problems  in  North  Africa” 
(Barbé 1999: 55). And more than ten years later, a Spanish official 
stated that “the future of our Southern Mediterranean partners will 
determine  the  external  dimension  of  the  European  construction” 
(Nadal 2002). In the Spanish discourse, the “failure” of the EU in 
the Mediterranean threatens the achieved progress of the EU inte-
gration and poses a threat to the future development of the EU inte-
gration. 
 
Spanish representatives, additionally to these symbolic arguments, 
also employed arguments of more pragmatic nature in the sense that 
the Mediterranean offers many unexplored opportunities to the EU. 
Spanish officials have also insisted on underlining the various inter-Natorski: Explaining Spanish and Polish Approaches to the ENP  87 
dependencies between Europe and the Mediterranean, for example, 
the level of economic interdependences in terms of trade, which are 
favourable to the EU, countries or the level of energetic dependence 
of  Europe.  With  these arguments,  Spanish  officials  have  tried  to 
counterbalance the perceived shift of the EU interest towards East-
ern Europe. For example, before the Barcelona Conference, Felipe 
González complained that the economic involvement of the EU in 
Eastern Europe was bigger than that in the Mediterranean (Tovias 
1999: 228). 
 
Polish discourse on the Eastern Dimension since 2001 has also been 
based on a preconceived set of arguments directed to the other EU 
partners (Haukkala 2002: 28). The analysis of documents and dis-
courses indicate that the Polish discourse is based on some recurrent 
arguments aimed at increasing the legitimacy of their proposals. Po-
land pretended to present the proposal of the Eastern Dimension as 
an opportunity to strengthen the “cohesion and coordination” of the 
EFP. Poland presented itself as the viable intermediary in relations 
with  Eastern  neighbours  indicating  good  relationship  with  these 
countries thus being in a position of “good advocate of their integra-
tion with Europe” (Cimoszewicz 2003b: 8) and presented itself as a 
case of successful economic and political transformation that might 
serve as example for other Eastern European states. Additionally, 
good knowledge of the region and the experience and know-how of 
Polish institutions, experts and NGOs was considered in Poland to 
be useful for Eastern countries and moreover it “can perhaps bring 
some new, fresh ideas to the discussion” in the EU (Ministry of 
Foreign Affairs 2003: 86). 
   
The need of establishing a separate Eastern Dimension of the EU 
was justified by the need to “abolish the existing dividing lines” 
(Ministry of Foreign Affairs 2003: 85) or preventing the appearance 
of “any new dividing lines between our newly born Europe in Co-
penhagen and the rest of the continent” (Cimoszewicz 2003b: 7). 
However, in the Polish discourse about the Eastern Dimension, the 
arguments about “responsibility”, “future of European integration” 
or “challenges and opportunities” also constitute the core of the ar-
gumentative resources. According to Danuta Hübner, the EU will 
become a global power but considering its nearest neighbourhood 
as its main area of responsibility (Hübner 2002: 5). The European 88  European Political Economy Review  
   
responsibility was grounded on Polish conviction that without its 
Eastern neighbours the project of European integration would be in-
complete since these countries are European in terms not only geo-
graphical, but also historical and cultural (Cimoszewicz 2004: 20). 
As stated by the Polish Minister of Foreign Affairs, “the East of 
Europe remains important for the future of the entire continent” and 
“the Eastern Dimension of the European Union should constitute 
one of the major pillars of the EU global profile”. Therefore, the 
prospect for Eastern Europe is also the strategic interests for the EU 
since  the  situation  in  these  countries  might  impact  on  the  whole 
European integration process. 
 
3.3. Lesson drawing among EU’s member states 
 
The  similarities  between  Spanish  and  Polish  performance  in  the 
framework of the EU neighbourhood policy might be explained by 
Poland’s process of lesson-drawing from the Spanish experiences in 
promoting the Mediterranean dimension of the EFP. The point of 
departure of a lesson-drawing process is normally the domestic dis-
satisfaction  with  current  policies  and  domestic  status  quo,  which 
motivates  policymakers  to  engage  in  a  process  of  learning  from 
abroad. Four degrees of adaptation of transferred programs and pol-
icy models through lessons-drawing can be distinguished: “copying 
(direct and complete transfer), emulation (adoption, with adjustment 
to different circumstances, of a program already in effect elsewhere, 
or the transfer of the ideas behind the program), combination (mix-
tures  of  policies  from  different  places),  and  inspiration  (another 
program inspiring policy change with the final outcome not drawing 
on the original)” (Schimmelfennig, Sedelmeier 2005: 21). 
 
Polish proposals of putting in place the Eastern Dimension of the 
EU were usually attributed to the Finnish example of advancing the 
Northern Dimensions of the EU. However it was concluded that this 
model was not fully extrapolable to Polish proposals since the mo-
tives underlying the Northern Dimension were hardly transferable 
to the Polish proposed Eastern Dimension (Haukkala 2002: 26-28; Natorski: Explaining Spanish and Polish Approaches to the ENP  89 
Browning, Joenniemi 2003; Makarychev 2004)
19. Additional expla-
nation of why the Northern Dimension was not fully adopted in Pol-
ish proposals might be that some Spanish experiences in promoting 
the  European  Mediterranean  policy  were  also  studied  in  Poland. 
This line of exploring the interaction between Eastern and Mediter-
ranean Dimension is grounded also on the fact that Spanish experi-
ences in democratic transformation as well as European integration 
constituted  an  important  reference  for  Polish  own  transformation 
process as well as European policy since the beginning of 1990s 
(Bernatowicz 1993). Additionally, this explanation is sustained by 
the fact that many actors involved in Polish foreign policy made 
multiple references to the Spanish case when the Polish European 
policy and the Eastern Dimension were discussed. Therefore, the 
additional source of explanation of some similarities between Polish 
and Spanish approaches to the European Neighbourhood Policy lies 
in the concepts of lesson-drawing and imitation. 
 
At the beginning of 2001, Poland’s foreign policy was dominated 
by the perception of failure of its Eastern policy as well as a feeling 
of  disappointment  and  impotence.  The  public  debate  on  Polish 
Eastern policy raised the need of reconsidering this policy in view 
of new challenges and opportunities created by the internal situation 
in Eastern neighbours and the accession to the EU. Many authors 
indicated that the implementation of Polish ambitious objectives of 
its Eastern policy could not be supported by sufficient instruments 
and  resources.  Therefore,  Poland’s  internal  debate  about  its  own 
Eastern policy evolved towards the consideration that the accession 
to the EU was a decisive factor that would affect positively the fu-
ture of the Polish Eastern policy bringing new opportunities to at-
tain Polish objectives (Najder 2001; Fundacja Stefan Batory 2001; 
Bachmann 2001; Wóycicki 2001). As a result of this internal debate, 
various Polish think-thanks presented well-elaborated propositions 
concerning the future of the relations between the enlarged EU and 
its new Eastern neighbours (Cichocki et al. 2002; Harasimowicz, 
śurawski vel Grajewski 2003; Pełczyńska-Nałęcz et al. 2003; Gro-
madzki et al. 2003). Many of the ideas expressed in these proposi-
                                                 
19 Due to this fact, the compatibility between Northern Dimension and Eastern 
Dimension was also questioned. Polish official documents reflect rather ambigu-
ous position on the future compatibility between those two dimensions. 90  European Political Economy Review  
   
tions were discussed in multiple conferences and seminars with par-
ticipations of Polish diplomats and further reflected in Polish offi-
cial proposals. 
 
In view of these concerns on Polish Eastern policy, various authors 
indicated Spain as an example of how an EU member state is pro-
jecting its specific traditional foreign policy concerns (Nowakowski 
1998: 9; Paszewski 2003: 14; Fundacja Stefan Batory 2001: 11). 
According to one of the proposals on Eastern Dimension of the EU, 
“it would be difficult to imagine the EU’s Common Foreign and 
Security Policy vis-à-vis Morocco or Latin America being formu-
lated without Spain’s participation. In a similar way, Poland should 
be involved in the shaping of the EU policy vis-à-vis Kyiv, Moscow 
or Minsk” (Harasimowicz, śurawski vel Grajewski 2003: 4)
20. In-
deed, some experiences of the Barcelona Process and Northern Di-
mension were indicated when the future Eastern Dimension of the 
EU was debated in Poland (Jesień 2002). Some experts pointed out 
that  Poland  in  order  to  learn  from  Spanish  experiences  should 
strengthen its interests in Mediterranean Dimension of the EU and 
examine Spanish policy in this region as well as cooperate with this 
country in some issues regarding the ENP (Wojna 2004: 1207). Al-
ready in 2001, various Polish think-thanks signalled the Barcelona 
Process as an example of the method to engage neighbours in coop-
eration with the EU (Instytut Spraw Publicznych 2001: 8). However, 
it  should  be  stressed  that  Spanish  experiences  were  not  studied 
thoroughly in Poland, but rather constituted a source of inspiration 
for the role that Poland could play in the EFP. 
 
This inspiration is even more salient among Polish policy-makers 
than among the  experts. Polish politicians promoting the Eastern 
Dimension in multiple occasions presented Spanish example as a 
precedent of successful projection of national concerns in the EFP 
framework. Therefore not only Poland does not question the exis-
tence of a strong Mediterranean Dimension but also publicly ac-
knowledges that the Eastern Dimension of the EU should build on 
the  experiences  derived  from  the  Barcelona  Process  (Ministry  of 
Foreign Affairs, 2003: 87). In this sense, some even state that the 
                                                 
20 It is worth noting the use of this argument by the Polish president when the 
Eastern Dimension of the EU was presented (Kwaśniewski 2003: 11). Natorski: Explaining Spanish and Polish Approaches to the ENP  91 
Barcelona Process provides them with good reason for insisting in 
the creation of an Eastern Dimension since “there is nothing equiva-
lent to the Barcelona Process in the present EU policy towards the 
Eastern neighbours – there are no assistance agreements or assis-
tance instruments comparable to those provided within the MEDA 
programme (…) the EU relations with its Eastern European coun-
tries  are  significantly  different  from  those  of  the  Mediterranean 
partners” (Cimoszewicz 2003d: 4). At the same time Poland refused 
the argument that the EU enlargement would have negative effects 
on the Barcelona Process. 
 
As argued by the Polish Ministry of Foreign Affairs, “cooperation 
between Spain and Poland might bring possibilities of mutual learn-
ing and enhancing the presence of both countries in Eastern and 
Southern neighbourhood of the EU” (Cimoszewicz 2003e). Poland 
expressed its support to the Barcelona Process and claimed that its 
experiences in transformation and “excellent” relations with many 
countries of the Mediterranean region could be a positive input to 
this policy. Therefore, Spanish experiences with its neighbourhood 
served as a source of inspiration for Polish considerations on the fu-
ture Eastern Dimension of the EU. The most important lessons from 
the Spanish experiences learned by Poland are that Eastern Dimen-
sion of the EU should be a Polish specialization in the framework of 
the EFP as the Mediterranean Dimension is a Spanish specialization. 
Additionally, the idea that Poland might play an important role in 
the EU policy in the Middle East is grounded on the traditionally 
very good relations between Poland and both Arabic countries and 
Israel started to gain supporters. In this sense, EU involvement in 
the Mediterranean basin is perceived as a suitable “resonance box” 
to emphasize Polish policy in the region (Waszczykowski 2004: 48-
49) and in this way to balance Poland’s involvement in “American 
projects” in the region – Iraq war. On the other hand, according to 
Spanish and Polish diplomats both countries started to share their 
experiences in dealing with respective neighbouring countries dur-
ing their bilateral relations in 2003. Spanish-Polish bilateral sum-
mits at the level of governments included discussions on ENP re-
lated issues (EuroPAP 2005a) and diplomatic meetings at the level 
of official focused on the Barcelona Process,  EU policy towards 
Middle East peace process and ENP. 
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4.  Conclusions 
 
This article was intended to examine Spanish and Polish proposals 
for European Neighbourhood Policy and to find out the origins of 
their resemblances. The article advances three sources of explana-
tion (national interests, institutional environment and lessons draw-
ing),  arguing  that  all  of  them  have  played  a  role  in  determining 
Spanish and Polish positions on the EU policy towards neighbour-
ing areas. 
 
The option of uploading Spanish and Polish national concerns re-
lated  to  the  neighbourhood  is  based  on  the  analogous  awareness 
about their geopolitical marginal situation in Europe. In both cases, 
the direct stimuli to their active policy of promotion of their respec-
tive  neighbourhood  agendas  arise  from  security  considerations. 
These security considerations include both “hard” military as well 
as  “soft”  security  concerns.  Similarly,  both  countries  attempt  to 
avoid the situation of being placed in the periphery of the continent 
and facing these challenges alone. On the other hand, both countries 
also perceive their geographical situation as an opportunity to Euro-
peanize their national concerns related to the neighbourhood and to 
exploit them in order to increase their role in the framework of EFP. 
 
In  order  to  advance  their  agendas,  both  countries  pursue  action 
aimed at gaining support from other actors of the EFP. In the dis-
cursive argumentation of these proposals, the predominant objective 
is that of the “Europeanisation” of the issues at stake in order to 
present them as important to the common project of the EU integra-
tion. Both countries try to push forward their own agenda to the top 
of the EFP agenda due to the fact that strategic priorities might be 
rewarded with sufficient financial support. Additionally, leadership 
in these specific initiatives serve as a tool to increase the country’s 
prestige in the EFP. 
 
In  effect,  Poland  refers  to  Spanish  experiences  in  promoting  the 
Barcelona Process as an inspiration for the Polish positioning in the 
making the Eastern policy of the EU. Therefore, even if the project 
of establishing the Eastern Dimension of the EU was not accepted, 
it  might  be  expected  that  specific  ideas  that  were  presented  will Natorski: Explaining Spanish and Polish Approaches to the ENP  93 
serve as the background for Polish initiatives when the EU will ad-
dress  questions  connected  to  this  geographical  area.  Bearing  in 
mind these objectives, Poland stresses its recognition of the roles 
played by Spain in the Mediterranean Dimension since it aspires to 
acquire similar position in Eastern policy of the EU. This Polish 
ambition to become a leading actor in the EU neighbourhood policy 
might be assessed both as a positive input for the development of a 
sound European Neighbourhood Policy, as well as a source of di-
vergence that could consolidate the new cleavage between the East-
ern and Southern EU member states. 
 
Finally,  in  further  research  should  be  considered  the  question  if 
Spanish and Polish policies in their respective neighbourhood repre-
sent a challenge for ENP during its implementation phase. Spain 
and Poland have different sensibilities and foreign policy traditions, 
which might constitute a potential source of divergence and rivality 
within the EU. The fact that Poland and Spain focus on their respec-
tive direct neighbourhoods constitutes potential source of incoher-
ence and inefficiency in the relations of the EU with neighbouring 
countries (despite similarities of Spanish and Polish proposals re-
garding  European  policy  towards  neighbourhood).  This  question 
emerges  from  observations  made  during  the  phase  of  conceptual 
preparation of the ENP. The answer to these questions depends on 
the research to be made during the phase of the full implementation 
of the ENP mechanisms and instruments and assessing their results. 
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